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“Moral Revenge of the Crowd”  
in the 1854 Revolution of Madrid* 
 
 
 
MARÍA ZOZAYA 
Universidad de Valladolid 
 
 
 
Have the slaves broken their chains? 
Spain and Liberty sounds everywhere!  
Is it a dream or is it true?  
Why does the vile cannon of the miserable slave 
rumble with the loyal cry of the brave? […] 
“and the hallowed fruit of the Fatherland and Liberty  
was thrown at the despot’s forehead covering him with terror”. 
Look, look, in turn the generous people try out the fight,  
will it be conquered?  
It is not enslaved, nor treacherous, nor ambitious 
 and it feels hurt with endless insults: 
the noble people dashingly inspired by the Fatherland and Liberty,  
rumbling inflamed with justified anger, 
 a tremendous bolt of lightening and by only rebelling, 
 rising to conquer. 
The 1854 Revolution Hymn. 
Manuel FERNÁNDEZ GONZÁLEZ 
 
 
Historiographical and Historical Context 
The revolution of July 1854 in Spain is a relatively little studied 
subject, especially if we compare it with other revolutionary periods such as 
the Napoleonic episode of 1808, the Liberal Triennium, or the Gloriosa of  
__________________________ 
*This research may be found in the projects: Grupos profesionales (HUM 2007-62675/HIST. 
Director: Francisco Villacorta); and Elites Contemporáneas (BABECYL/GR110. Director: 
Pedro Carasa). 
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1868.1 This may due to two factors. In the first place, it was generally 
considered to be a great disappointment, i.e. as the disaster of the liberal 
revolution that did not prosper. Some contemporaries branded it a failure 
declaring that it was instrumentalised by the parties in power,2 asserting that 
they had deceived the people with their promises of revolution.3 In second 
place it has equally been dismissed by subsequent studies,4 considering it as 
that social revolution that never materialised for the bourgeoisie.5 It is 
probable that these negative readings were determined by the fall of the 
Progressive Biennium that was born after that revolution, or because it was 
eclipsed by the so-called Gloriosa revolution of 1868 and also by the 
importance of the Spanish First Republic in 1873. 
 
There was however a small number of historians who studied the 1854 
Revolution. They did consider it not only to be relevant but even to be a key 
period of Spanish liberalism.6 In general they tended to seek in it either 
aspects in accordance with the Spanish historiography of the period, or themes 
unconnected to cultural history: the political process, the leaders, and political 
formations7; the role of the rural world in politics;8 the origins of the workers’ 
                                                 
1
 It is perhaps this lack of Spanish attention to the subject that has meant that the British 
specialists in this archaic forms of protest have paid virtually no attention to the 1854 
Revolution. Hobsbawm only mentions the period when he speaks about the social movements 
owing to famine in Andalusia and the abolishment of feudal rights: Eric Hobsbawm, Primitive 
Rebels. Studies in archaic forms of social movement in the 19th and 20th centuries 
(Manchester: University Press, 1959), 79-80. Tilly alludes to the 1854 revolution as a part of a 
period for the advance of social liberal institutions with military seizures of power, after 
which insurrections abounded. Charles Tilly, European Revolutions, 1492-1992 (Cambridge: 
Blackwell, 1993), 86-87. 
2
 Francisco Pi y Margall and Antoni Jutglar [critical editor of the first publication, 
1856], La reacción y la revolución: estudios políticos y sociales (Madrid: Minuesa, 1982), 27-
33. 
3
 Pedro Pascual Sama, Disertación sobre las ventajas y beneficios que ha obtenido el 
pueblo español de la gloriosa revolución de julio de 1854 (Badajoz: D. G. Orduña, 1856). 
4
 Charles Esdaile and Javier Tusell, Época Contemporánea (Barcelona: Crítica, 2007), 
111-112. 
5
 Raymond Carr, España, 1808-1975 (Barcelona: Ariel, 2008), 244-250. That happened 
in the context of the studies that were searching for the revolutionary models of France or 
England, as Manfred Kossok explains: “Historia comparativa de las revoluciones de la época 
moderna. Problemas metodológicos y empíricos de la investigación”, in: Manfred Kossok; 
Albert Soboul; Gerard Brendler; Jürgen Kübler et ali, Las revoluciones burguesas (Barcelona: 
Crítica, 1983), 15, 9-98. 
6
 I. e.: J. Ramón Urquijo, “La revolución de 1854 en Zamora”. Hispania, LI/I, 177 
(1991), 245-286. V. G. Kiernan, La revolución de 1854 en España (Madrid: Consulta e 
Historia, 1970). 
7
 Marie-Claude Lecuyer, “Formación de Juntas en la Revolución de 1854”, Estudios de 
Historia Social 22-23 (1982). José A. Ruiz, “La Revolución de 1854 en Lorca”, Anales de 
Historia Contemporánea. Cátedra de Historia Contemporánea 6 (1982). Rafael Zurita, 
Revolución y burguesía: Alicante (1854-1856) (Valencia: Generalitat, 1990). 
8
 Juan A. Inarejos, La Revolución de 1854 en la España rural. El bienio progresista en 
Ciudad Real (1854-1856) (Ciudad Real: Instituto de Estudios Manchegos, 2011). 
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movement, the process of the historical configuration of a social class,9 the 
origin of working-class awareness,10 the social question in the industrialising 
process,11 even in a wider sense, and the representation of the working-class 
world in Spanish historiography.12 Because of their emphasis on these 
objectives, the mechanisms of popular protest in this revolution were not 
studied. In European historiography however (especially that of Britain), a 
number of new interpretations had been made of the popular protest, with a 
close analysis of its actual role without a priori configurations.13 
 
In my opinion this neglect of the popular protest mechanisms of the 
1854 revolution may be due to two reasons. Firstly, it is a result of the 
following of the recently mentioned historiographical tendencies prevailing in 
Spain from 1950 to 1980, which were conditioned both by the censorship of 
Franco’s dictatorship and by the fight against it by liberal and Marxist 
currents. Secondly, it is because as early as the 19th century attempts had been 
made to silence such popular disturbances. Initially there was little talk of 
these riots because they made the bourgeoisie and more conservative groups 
uneasy and fearful of a revolution similar to that of 1848 in Europe,14 as was 
                                                 
9
 Manuel Tuñón Lara, El movimiento obrero en la Historia de España (Barcelona: 
Laia, 1977). Clara E. Lida, Anarquismo y revolución en la España del XIX (Madrid: Siglo 
XXI, 1972). Benet Martí, Barcelona a mitjan segle XIX. El movimient obrer durant el Bienni 
progresista (1854-1856) (Valencia: Curial, 1978).  
10
 Leopoldo Porras Granero, El pueblo en la novela española del siglo XIX (Gran 
Canaria: La Laguna Universidad, 2005), 75-95. He situates the 1854 revolution in the 
previous moment to the working class consciousness. 
11
 Jaime Carrera Pujal, Historia Política de Cataluña en el Siglo XIX. T.IV. La segunda 
Guerra Carlista y las Revoluciones de 1848 y 1854 (Barcelona: Bosch, 1957), 233-250.  
12
 I refer to the Spanish controversy created by Julián Casanova, La Historia Social y 
los historiadores. ¿Cenicienta o princesa? (Barcelona: Crítica, 1991); followed by: Carlos 
Forcadell “Sobre desiertos y secanos: los movimientos sociales en la historiografía española” 
Historia Contemporánea 7 (1992), 101-106. See also: Pere Gabriel, “A vueltas y revueltas 
con la Historia Social obrera en España” Historia Social 22 (1995), 43-53. About that 
situation and the classic and modern historiography, see the article of: Carlos Gil Andrés, 
“Protesta popular y movimientos sociales en la España de la restauración: los frutos de la 
ruptura” Historia Social 23 (1995), 121-135. 
13
 Eric Hobsbawm, Primitive rebels, op.cit. Eric Hobsbawm and George Rudé, Captain 
Swing (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1969). Edward P. Thompson, The Making of the 
English Working Class (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968); specially “The moral economy of 
the English crowd in the 18th century” Past & Present, 50 (1971): 76-136. Also: George 
Rudé, The Crowd in History (USA: Interlink Pub Group, 1981), and the Spanish version 
revisited: La multitud en la Historia: los disturbios populares en Francia e Inglaterra: 1730-
1848 (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 2009). 
14
 As Nicomedes Pastor-Díaz was afraid of, “Los problemas del socialismo. Lecciones 
pronunciadas en el Ateneo de Madrid en el curso 1848-1849”, Obras de don Nicomedes 
Pastor Díaz, de la Real Academia Española (Madrid: Manuel Tello, 1868), T. IV. About the 
possible meaning of this revolution in Spain, from a liberal perspective, see the political study 
of the poet: Ventura Ruiz Aguilera, Europa Marcha (Madrid: 1848). 
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pointed out by the French observer Turgot.15 Likewise, the popular 
revolutionary actions of 1854 were also hushed up because they were 
considered to constitute vandalism. This riotous behaviour was contrary to the 
civilising and progressive ideas that should in theory be in keeping with the 
democratic regime that the disturbances helped to implement. Those attacks 
were linked to forms of protest that had been denounced as primitive, when in 
fact they were precisely responsible for the advent of a progressive democratic 
system that was considered to regenerate the power of the people. This may 
perhaps explain why so little importance was attached to those popular 
revolutionary actions. An attempt was even made to justify and legitimate 
them, given that in the last analysis they were the basis of the new liberal 
power that was born of the 1854 Revolution, the origin of the Progressive 
Biennial (1854-1856). These themes will be treated in this study after we have 
made some comments on the historical context and the general situation. 
 
The period before the revolution was quite critical. This could be the 
abstract of July 1854: drought, hunger, economic and governmental crisis. The 
conservative-liberal party, called Moderate, had been in power for ten years 
(the so-called Moderate Decade, 1843-1853). Its political administration and 
corruption in the world of business gave rise to real scandals. For this reason, 
some members of the armed forces originally belonging to their Moderate 
Party rose against them in the Vicalvarada. From there, the movement became 
the progressive liberal party. The people joined them, fighting against those 
politicians, in defence of “true liberalism.” To harm them, it attacked their 
home towns, the newspaper representing them and the club where they met. In 
these pages we study these symbolic attacks as from coeval sources, mainly 
literature, narrative, pamphlets and newspapers. We will consider the 
identification of moderate power with the places they attack, the mechanisms 
justifying such attacks and the apparent contradiction accompanying their 
cries for freedom. 
 
Causes: Politics and Sociability in the Sartorius Ministry 
The controversial ministry which would provoke the grave crisis lasted 
from September 19th 1853 to July 17th 1854.16 It was presided by Luis José 
Sartorius, who came from a humble family of Polish origin living in Seville. 
His eagerness allowed a meteoric rise in his ambitious career. The lawyer-
politician, Juan Bravo Murillo had taken him to his lawyer’s practice to work. 
The journalist Andrés Borrego had initiated him in political journalism, taking 
him to the column of his newspaper, opening the doors of his home. But soon, 
                                                 
15
 V. G. Kiernan, op.cit., 60-61. He quotes the diplomatic correspondence between 
Turgot and Drouyn de Lhuys in Espagne. 
16
 Its composition in: Juan R. Urquijo, Gobiernos y ministros españoles (Madrid: CSIC, 
2001), 53. 
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he would betray them. From Borrego he would seize the ownership of El 
Correo Nacional in critical moments, when the renowned journalist had 
emigrated due to the conservative coup d’état of October 1841. In the case of 
Bravo Murillo, he managed to make him fall out with some of the political 
elements supporting him.17 Then he founded and directed the moderate 
newspaper El Heraldo, an instrument of opposition against the progressive 
regency of Espartero. He leapt to Congress in 1843, where he obtained 
numerous profitable businesses, always managing to combine practicality with 
pleasantness.18 In 1847 Narváez appointed him Minister of the Presidency, on 
request of the Queen Mother, María Cristina. In 1848 he received two titles: 
Count of San Luis and Viscount of Priego. He occupied several ministries 
before leading this cabinet in 1853, called Polish due to his family origins. 
Since his appointment he was very criticised by the entire press, declared as 
his fanatical enemy.19 
 
In his ministry, to be considered now, politics and sociability brought 
about a common union in a male club.20 Its base of operations was the Casino 
del Príncipe, to which several of his representatives belonged. Founded in 
1836 by the conservative political class, it facilitated the meeting and 
socialisation of the leading figures of the government. Like all private clubs 
for men, it was only possible to be admitted by being introduced by another 
member, by which, sponsorship of new members maintained and reproduced 
the power matrix. As said power was abusively imposed, its negative image 
eventually condensed in the Casino. It became the Madrid centre for 
representation of the politicians and businessmen made wealthy during the 
Moderate Decade (1843-1853), in the power symbol and speculative fortunes 
of the Isabelline monarchy. Moreover, it gathered all its external signs of 
luxury and pomp.21 For these reasons, it was the same as some of its members, 
the target of selective attacks from the people during the 1854 Revolution in 
Madrid. 
 
                                                 
17
 Luciano Taxonera, La Revolución del 54 (Sartorius y su gobierno) (Madrid: 
Atlántico, 1931), 15-17. 
18
 Ramón Campoamor, Historia crítica de las Cortes reformadoras (Madrid: Uzal-
Aguirre, 1845), 226-230; 227. 
19
 Modesto Lafuente (Collaborators: Valera; Pirala; Borrego). Historia general de 
España (Barcelona: Montaner-Simón, 1890; T.XXIII), 175. Several years before the July 
revolution, in 1848, the international observer Ferdinand Lesseps criticized all the politicians 
who afterwards will form that Ministry, in: Antonio Moliner, Lesseps y los politicos españoles 
(el informe de 1848) (Alicante: Juan Gil Albert, 1993), 39, 40, 44, 51, 54, 68, 73.  
20
 As the phenomenon detected in french sociability by: Maurice Agulhon, Le Cercle 
dans la France Bourgeoise, étude d´une mutation de sociabilité (Paris: Armand Colin, 1977). 
21
 Since 1868, it would change its name for Casino de Madrid due to the previous 
monarchic connotations. María Zozaya, El Casino de Madrid, orígenes y primera andadura 
(Madrid: Casino, 2002), 115-116. 
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Sartorius himself was a member probably since 1836, from the 
beginning (because -the same as other founder members-, his entry date was 
not published, although his introduction of the lawyer José Maceda Quirós 
was recorded in 1841). Regarding the remaining ministers, we will 
concentrate on those who were members. The Minister of State was entrusted 
to Ángel Calderón de la Barca. He became a club member in September 1853, 
just four days before joining the cabinet. He was sponsored by the Marquis of 
Casa Irujo, who established important connections in the Casino, introducing 
relevant moderate politicians, like Manuel Pérez Hernández or the Marquises 
of Remisa and Miraflores.22 
Agustín Esteban Collantes, Minister of Promotion, was a member 
since 1842. He was one of the most distinguished followers of the Count of 
San Luis, with whom he created the colour and meaning of the Polish 
ministry.23 Its administration was full or irregularities and accusations. One of 
the most important issues of the latter was an abusive purchase of tons of 
stones for public works, from which he managed to come out untouched, in 
spite of occupying the interest of his journalistic critics for quite a long time.24  
 
The Minister of Justice was José Castro Orozco, Marquis of Gerona, 
possibly a member since its origin, who introduced in 1840 the recently 
elected Member of Parliament, Valentín Olano, lawyer of the royal councils. 
Furthermore, another founder of the circle was his brother Francisco de Paula 
Castro Orozco, also a politician who served as minister between 1837-1838, 
and as president of the Congress in 1845. The journalist Ramón Campoamor 
accused him, together with his political colleagues, of the vested approach to 
the royal institution, its adhesion to the puritan party, its palace and royalist 
tendencies more than constitutional ones.25 
 
Eduardo Fernández San Román, provisional Minister of War, was an 
active member of the Casino, where he sponsored several members. His 
brother Federico entered in 1852 introduced by the unenthusiastic progressive 
Luis Sagasti. Later Sagasti was civil governor of Madrid, from August 1854, 
when the social crisis worsened, followed by a grave cholera epidemic which 
would kill him in 1855.26 
                                                 
22
 Archives of the Casino de Madrid; Member Lists; Miguel Ángel Ramírez 
(hereinafter: ACM;LS;MAR): nº 11.128; nº 13252; nº 10.884; nº 10.837; nº 10835; nº 11.132. 
23
 Modesto Lafuente (Collaborators: Valera; Pirala; Borrego), op.cit., 175. 
24
 J. Luis Sánchez, “Un retrato de Agustín Esteban Collantes”, Archivo Español de Arte 
292 (2000): 406-407. 
25
 ACM;LS;MAR: nº 11.035; nº 10.779. Congress Archive; Electoral Documentation 
Series (hereinafter: ACD;SDE): 24 nº 41. Ramón Campoamor, op.cit, 23-27. 
26
 San Román introduced in the Club: Saturnino G.Parra (15-X-1852), Luciano Marín 
(31-X-1852), Ignacio Warza (1-IX-1853). The Minister of the Treasury Félix Domenech was 
not member of the Casino. ACM;LS;MAR: nº 11.701; nº 11.704; nº 11864; nº 11.694. Juan R. 
Urquijo, La revolución de 1854 en Madrid (Madrid: CSIC, 1984), 224, 229, 237, 394, 408, 
442. 
24 
 
 
Finally, the Minister of The Navy was the great speaker, Mariano Roca 
Togores, Marquis of Molins. He was a cofounder of the Casino in 1836 but 
had left in January 1847, when they appointed him minister for the first time, 
an action repeated by others of his most conservative puritan group like 
Nicomedes Pastor Díaz.27 Then, this espace de sociabilité was an informal 
centre for the conservative political power, which explains that afterwards, 
during the crisis, turned up to be one goal of the popular attacks. 
 
The Excesses: The Forging of the Insurrection Against the Sartorius 
Ministry 
By 1853, the government was facing a critical situation. Droughts, bad 
harvests and weakness of the Treasury caused economic losses.28 As far as 
politics were concerned, the moderate liberals had been in power since 1843, a 
power already totally foreign to the progressive liberal groups. Corruption had 
almost taken over the government. Members of Parliament, Senators and 
entrepreneurs blended their interests with state grants. As would be stated 
afterwards: 
 
“no railway line has been granted, something relevant, without having 
previously received an abundant subsidy; no file has been opened, without 
having taken some personal amount and even public posts have been sold 
shamelessly.”29 
 
One of the most scandalous businesses was that of railway contracts 
monopolised by power groups close to Isabel II and specially her mother 
María Cristina, who was considered the “soul of the moderate party” by the 
French diplomatic Ferdinand Lesseps.30 María Cristina lived in Las Rejas 
Palace with her husband the Duke of Riánsares.31 Inspired in the press of the 
time, the writer Pérez Galdós revives this atmosphere of popular discontent: 
 
“afterwards we have started to speak badly about the Government […]. We 
repeat all the horrors for which they accused Sartorius and his shameless 
colleagues, and then, as a final touch, we go to Las Rejas Street, Cristina’s 
Palace, which according to the clandestine papers is the den of iniquity, the 
filthy workshop of the dirty railway deals and furthermore… it is a seraglio, a 
                                                 
27
 ACM;LS;MAR: nº. 10647. 
28
 The social causes of the revolution are described in: Pascual Madoz, Libertad y 
progreso en la monarquía isabelina (Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 1982), 223-313. 
29
 Dionisio Pérez, “La revolución de 1854”, Por esos mundos (1-VI-1905): 560-561. 
30
 Antonio Moliner, op.cit., 34. 
31
 Juan R. Urquijo, La revolución de 1854, op.cit., 104. Pedro Díaz, Después de la 
revolución (Alicante: Juan Gil Albert, 1998), 349-363. Telesforo-Marcial Hernández, 
Ferrocarriles y capitalismo en el País Valenciano (Valencia: Town Hall, 1983), 107-121. 
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pandemonium where all the Machiavellian plans against freedom are 
forged.”32 
 
Multiple voices rose against such abuse from the government, 
considering it opposite to true liberalism. They called for insurrection. They 
incited from the press, skits and famous clandestine papers, like El Murciélago 
(independent newspapers were pursued, including the Times).33 Rafael Pérez 
Vento, José de Zaragoza, Joaquín de la Gándara, José de Salamanca Mayol or 
Fernando Fernández de Córdova were the targets of regular critique, like other 
similar casino members. Luciano Taxonera represented their style of conduct: 
 
“trickery and border politics; politics without an honest spirit and idealism -
Blaser, Doménech, Dulce, Calderón Collantes, Sartorius…-. Sartorius, clear 
intelligence, daring character, brave heart, from 1853 to 1854 he remained 
with scandals and fell enveloped in the scandal opening the door to the 
revolution.”34 
 
The Catalysts: Railways and Deportations.  
 
Since November 1853, numerous moderate groups had met 
clandestinely. Meanwhile, Sartorius remained thanks to the support provided 
by Isabel II, although he was aware of the clearly hostile private meetings 
held, which the intention of overthrowing him –meetings not only between 
groups of different ideology, but even friends who had supported him in his 
sly borderline activities.  
 
“the latter was followed by O´Donnell, the Concha brothers, Ros de Olano, 
Mesina, Serrano, and behind them –the structure of Spanish life so imposed 
it- were many civilians, with greater ideological strength than the armed 
forces, but with less luck or little daring. They were the Dukes of Sotomayor 
and Rivas, Mon y Pidal, who were reinforced by the progressives led by 
Infante, Madoz, Chacón, Zavala, Luján and San Miguel, to name but a few... 
[…] They were already conspiring openly and every day, every week, 
the conspiracy continued, not stopping its attacks on the royalty.”35 
 
In Christmas 1853, the contacts were established for a formal 
conspiracy. Domingo Dulce, Félix Messina, Rafael Echagüe and the 
                                                 
32
 Benito Pérez-Galdós, La Revolución de Julio (Madrid: Tello, 1903), 84. 
33
 Pi y Margall and Antoni Jutglar, op.cit., 27-33. Benito Pérez-Galdós, op.cit. Cristino 
Martos, La Revolución de Julio en 1854 (Madrid: Colegio de Sordomudos y Ciegos, 1854), 
84. ACD;SDE: 32 nº 18. Ildefonso A. Bermejo, Alzamiento popular de 1854, que comprende 
desde la cuestión de ferro-carriles hasta la entrada del duque de la Victoria en Madrid 
(Madrid: Mellado, 1854), 2. 
34
 Luciano Taxonera, op.cit, 21-22. 
35
 Ibid, 46-47. 
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quartermaster-general León integrated the Junta.36 Several months afterwards, 
they became a powerful opposition, headed by Generals O´Donnell, Ros de 
Olano, as well as the brothers Manuel and José Gutiérrez de la Concha. 
 
The basic catalyst was the new Railway Draft Bill. Its numerous 
opposed interests provoked a vigorous dispute between the Senate and the 
Parliament causing the closure of the latter.37 After suspending the sessions, 
Sartorius commenced a persecution of the moderate military chiefs. He 
separated known dangerous generals from their military postings –especially 
from the Madrid political centres: Joaquín Armero, to León; O´Donnell, to 
Tenerife; Manuel Bermúdez de Castro and Manuel Gutiérrez de la Concha, to 
the Canary Islands; his younger brother Jose, to the Balearic Islands with 
Facundo Infante. O´Donnell did not obey the order, hiding in Madrid for five 
months full of incidents, among other places in the home of Marquis of Vega 
Armijo.38 
 
According to Pérez Galdós, such deportations stimulated the fever of 
revolution within the blood of Spain.39 The news was also commented in 
moderate sociability venues and clubs “par excellence”. In it, the American 
diplomat, Essaias Warren –direct observer of the events – narrated the effect 
of the destitutions: On the 17th, Sartorius’ measure against the opposition was 
known: “There was great excitement in the Casino and in the Café del 
Suizo.”40  
 
The Forging of a Revolution: Insurrection, Persecutions and Conspiracy 
 
José Gutiérrez de la Concha was deported to the Balearic Islands. He 
escaped to France and “en route” met Dulce and Hore, discussing the 
Saragossa uprising.41 On February 20th, Juan Jose Hore led such insurrection 
in Saragossa –that´s why is the first name and city to be mentioned in the 1854 
                                                 
36
 Joaquín Buxó, Domingo Dulce, general Isabelino (Barcelona: Planeta, 1962), 250. 
37
 Ildefonso A. Bermejo, op.cit., 1-2. Joaquín I. Mencos, Memorias de don Joaquín 
Ignacio Mencos, conde de Guenduláin, 1799-1882 (Pamplona: Aramburu, 1952), 201-203. 
38
 Luciano Taxonera, op.cit., 89. Afterwards, O´Donnell hid in Angel Fernandez de los 
Ríos’ home, who would later be part of the Junta of Salvation, Army and Defence of Madrid, 
like Vega Armijo. Joaquín Buxó, op.cit., 251. The destitutions: Juan R. Urquijo, La 
revolución de 1854, op.cit. 44; 54-55. 
39
 Benito Pérez-Galdós, op.cit., 51-52. 
40
 Joaquín Buxó, op.cit., 251; who cites John Essaias Warren. Madrid hace cincuenta 
años a los ojos de un diplomático extranjero (Madrid, 1904). In the “pliegos de cordel” [song 
sheet] and engravures appear the meetings helded at the corner of El Suizo café. The 
engravures in: Dionisio Pérez, op.cit., 561 (picture number 7). 
41
 Joaquín Buxó, op.cit., 251. In Bourdeaux he also met the conservative politician 
Baron of Bigüezal, expressing his anger against the Queen. Joaquín I. Mencos, op.cit., 205. 
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hymn--42 which was quickly repressed and for which the state of siege was 
declared throughout Spain.43 On February 22nd, a severe raid was made against 
the political adversaries in Madrid, causing the closure of the Athenaeum 
Society (“Ateneo de Madrid”) and the arrest of many Members of Parliament 
and journalists.44 
 
We should mention that some of those pursued beforehand would play 
a special role some months later. Moreover, they belonged to the Casino del 
Principe, where people plotting against the established power could already be 
found. On the one hand, Manuel Bermúdez de Castro, member since 1847 was 
among those arrested. Luis González Bravo, ex-president of the Cabinet 
Meeting was a member since 1843. Manuel Rancés Villanueva, then director 
of the newspaper El Español, was admitted in the club in January 1853, 
sponsored by José Luis Albareda. Finally, in 1850 another editor of Español 
entered, the Member of Parliament Dionisio López Roberts. Between 1853 
and 1856, he introduced several people in the circle, the same as his brother 
Mauricio López Roberts, also a Member of Parliament, proposed for the club 
by Luis Fernández de Córdova on January 1st 1853. Besides, there were other 
members of the Casino who did not fall into the hands of the Polish police for 
strange reasons: José Rúa Figueroa, director of the journal La Nación, 
member since 1853. Diego Coello Quesada, director of the La Época, 
sponsored in the club by Salvador Bermúdez de Castro (Manuel’s brother, 
another of those repressed). Juan Lorenzana, editor of El Español, who joined 
the Casino the same day as Mauricio López Roberts, mentioned already.45 
Finally, Antonio Cánovas del Castillo would be admitted after the events. 
 
Domingo Dulce played a fundamental role in the insurrection. He 
joined the Casino in April 1854, when conspirators met at O’Donnell’s home 
and other places where the plot was maturing. On June 13th everything was 
prepared to commence the insurrection, where Dulce was essential in his post 
of Director General of the Cavalry.46 To obtain this post he had to win the 
trust of the Minister of War, Anselmo Blaser. He provided him continuous 
evidence of not belonging to the conspirators. However, his participation in 
the political conspiracies was a fact. In the Casino that incoherence was 
openly commented:  
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“A few nights ago –Isaías Warren reported in March- I heard 
comments made in the Casino about Blaser’s blindness on entrusting 
Dulce with the General Directorate of Cavalry.”47 
 
The Casino seemed to have become a double-edged sword. Firstly, 
during the moderate decade, it had become a clique of corrupt ministers. The 
leaders of the Sartorius group met there, talking about the development of 
revolutionary events.48 Secondly, from the start of the crisis, it was also a 
meeting place for moderate groups, which had separated themselves from that 
corrupt policy, conspiring to change the country’s destiny. Numerous 
conspirators frequented the club, participating in the later revolutionary 
events. The Gutiérrez de la Concha brothers, plus Joaquín Armero, Bermúdez 
de Castro and Vega Armijo, who had entered the circle hardly a year before, 
could be found there. Between 1853 and 1854 important figures became 
members, involved in the broad group of conspirators. 
 
Then, the Casino was used as a discrete means of exchanging 
information and as a camouflage scenario in the final arrangements of the 
conspiracy. Especially when O’Donnell became impatient about the idea of 
the insurrection and Domingo Dulce asked for discretion, trying to show 
calmness actively participating in its social life. When all the manifestos were 
ready, (based on national discontent, abuse of power and the repressive 
politics of Sartorius’ government), General Dulce continued defending before 
the ministry that no plot existed. However, June 28th 1854 was the day chosen 
for the uprising, when Dulce supposedly would direct some cavalry exercises 
trying new saddles in Vicálvaro.49 The previous day he wanted the Minister of 
War, Anselmo Blaser, to believe that the rebellion being spoken about had 
been quashed. He spent the first part of the night in the Casino with him, 
together with Castro, León and the Marquis of Perales. Domingo Dulce 
calmed Blaser down with the most emphatic protests of affection and 
loyalty.50 To prove it, later they went together to Ángela Chacón’s house 
playing the card game called tresillo until very late, managing to dilute the 
Minister of War’s suspicions.51 But the day after, the insurrection started. 
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The Outbreak: Vicalvarada and Revolution 
 
On June 28th, General Dulce’s speeches to his regiments in the Guard 
Grounds of Vicálvaro started; O´Donnell left his hideaway to go there. He was 
joined by Ros de Olano, Félix Messina and another twenty-five superior 
officers. On the 30th they opposed the government in the later so-called 
Vicalvarada. Each side claimed for itself an uncertain victory. Until that 
moment, the insurrection had been military and rather conservative. But in 
Manzanares, the progressive General Serrano joined and gave a truly 
revolutionary manifesto signed by O´Donnell, theoretically drafted∫ by 
Antonio Cánovas del Castillo.52 That same afternoon, the matter was 
commented with surprise in the Casino by his uncle, the journalist Estébanez 
Calderón and his brother-in-law, the well-known entrepreneur José de 
Salamanca.53 
 
With the Manifiesto de Manzanares the army movement took on a 
political form. It requested support from the people, listing its principles and 
declaring loyalty to the Monarchy:  
 
“we want to preserve the throne, but without the lobby dishonouring it; we 
want a rigorous practice of the fundamental laws, improving them, especially 
the electoral and press laws; we want a reduction of taxes, based on a strict 
economy; we want the years of service and merit respected in military and 
civilian employment; we want to uproot the villages from the centralisation 
devouring them.”54 
 
The strong progressive concessions of the manifesto completely 
changed the political sense of the uprising. The military group which had 
initially intended a change of government without counting with the people 
would now be seen as totally supported by it. The people managed to give a 
democratic touch to the revolution by means of various disturbances.55 They 
achieved this by force, which was their main power base at the time.56 It 
would be precisely the people who would give a strong dramatic colour to the 
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events and make the movement a revolution with national undertones.57 The 
popular insurrection was seconded by Cuenca, Valladolid, Zamora, 
Guadalajara, Barcelona and Andalusia. There were revolutionary attitudes of 
the crowd all over Spain:58 There were pressures upon owners by threatening 
damage to their proprieties. There were common popular protests trying to 
establish a collective negotiation threatening mutiny to demand a reduction on 
grain prices.59 The speculation of grain provoked the protests in the Zamora 
insurrection of 1854. In Valencia they burnt the railway bridge over the Turia 
river. In Barcelona, the popular revolution was dominated by workers, who 
channelled their protests against exploitation and towards the burning of 
industrialised machines called self-actings and the attainment of the right of 
association.60  All revolutionary acts in the cities were significative towards 
achieving the triumph of the liberal revolution.61 
 
In Madrid, the popular mutiny broke out on July 17th, since the 
government had fallen, but the people requested a change of system.62 It 
started in the bullring crowded by bullfighting fans and politics lovers. Among 
cheers for the mutineers, they requested the musicians to play Riego’s Hymn,* 
which reverberated at the doors of the square and gradually increasing in 
intensity, when the choir arrived at the Puerta del Sol; it was as if the whole of 
Madrid was singing63 Music was necessary to exacerbate popular agitation.64 
There and in other places, the boos against the Queen Mother were mixed with 
cheers for O´Donnell and Espartero. The new government wanted to re-
establish order and the shooting began.65 
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Together with July 19th it was one of the most violent days. All the 
disturbances were strongly repressed by the Government, entrusting this task 
to Generals Fernando Fernández de Córdova, Joaquín de la Gándara and Juan 
de Lara, then Captain General of Madrid. The three were members of the 
Casino for at least a decade.66 Some chronicles regarding the repression 
agreed with respect to its virulence symbolised by the volleys that silenced 
those popular voices shouting in the barricades long live the Fatherland.67 
Afterwards, they were called the Shrapnel Cabinet. This hardness was 
probably hiding the fear of a revolution like the one that had overthrown the 
French government to bring the Second Republic (1848-1852), when in the 
neighbouring country primitive echoes of the popular extremes of the French 
Revolution were still latent.68 
Later on, the three justified their actions alleging due obedience to 
their superior’s orders or the need to contain the people to safeguard public 
order.69 I consider that the posterior assertions of Gándara, Lara, and Córdoba 
were prompted by the progressive liberal victory that was due to the 
intervention of the people. For this reason, having repressed the masses 
harshly, all of them would attempt to identify themselves with the people and 
their proclamations. To exonerate himself Gándara appealed to his humble 
origins and to his father’s liberal tradition, to his continuous “defence of the 
people’s cause” and his burning patriotism.70 Fernández Córdoba emphasised 
the military tradition of his family and his loyalty to those furthering the 
public cause, which led him to defend the rule of law, legality, morals, and 
justice;71 these ideals were the same as those of the people that Córdoba 
himself had repressed. Lara pointed out that he had simply intended to defend 
the crown and law and order; at the same time he took pains to distinguish the 
innocent masses from the evil mob that attacked the buildings, stating that he 
had no wish to treat “thieves and fire-raisers in the same way as the unarmed 
people, peaceful spectators of those horrible scenes.”72 Like the others, Lara 
declared himself in this way to be on the people’s side in his statement, which 
was written months after the events. 
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Popular Justice: The Moral Revenge of the Crowd 
 
In the July outbreak in Madrid, there were two main facts. The first 
one was the barricades that meant the real outbreak of the revolutionary 
situation.73 They were erected with cobblestones, chairs, mattresses, barrels, 
etc. Those barricades were organized with modern techniques by the French 
refugees and Mining Engineers.74 They made the war in the streets, as it was 
called from the beginning of the 1848 Revolution. The other main fact was the 
assault of property. They attacked the homes of the main ministers of 
Sartorius’ government and peers: Collantes, Salamanca, Domenech, Quinto, 
Vistahermosa, María Cristina.75 They also attacked the main office of El 
Heraldo and the Casino club. 
 
 
 
Barricade in Montera Street, July 17th”. Lithography by J. J. Martínez, edited by 
Antonio Santa Coloma in Un hijo del Pueblo, Las jornadas de Julio…, 288. 
 
 
To explain the social feeling during the protest which transformed such 
objects and buildings into the enemy’s symbol, we resort to the concept of the 
moral revenge of the crowd. In this way, we change the expression coined by 
Edward P. Thompson of moral economy of the crowd, to explain the 
insurrections due to the adulteration and price rise of bread in the England of 
the XVIII century. He refers to moral conventions that regulate the trade and 
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the daily life of the crowd, guided by normative ideas of reciprocity, 
obligation, responsibility and justice.76 In the latter, the most remarkable fact 
was that the people attacked the millers, sold their bread at the price 
considered just and giving it to the miller afterwards.77 Also, when the crowd 
felt that their moral law was transgressed, it attacked their proprieties in 
different forms of violence.78 This behaviour can be interpreted as the 
“levelling instinct” of the multitude.79 In the protest we are discussing, the 
people, claimed a government system ruled by morals and the Constitution, 
taking justice into their own hands and attacking the icons of corrupt power, 
symbolically overthrowing them with very singular mechanisms. Such logic 
of conduct is typical in the popular insurrections of original liberalism. They 
searched a justice ruled by equal moral systems, already fully shared by 
collective mentalities.80 In this case in the capital of Spain, july 1854, they 
burnt or attacked symbols of power. In Madrid, that kind of popular justice 
that attacked the proprieties without hurting their owners could be found in 
1808 with the rebellions against Godoy and its Ministers.81 These traditional 
forms of protest were still used in the middle XIXth century Europe.82 
 
In short, in an agreed way and in different places of Madrid, the people 
selectively attacked different buildings of the moderate group in power. They 
burnt the furniture of several palaces belonging to politicians and 
entrepreneurs, attacking institutional buildings to assault their members, burn 
their belongings or flatten their lodgings. They channelled their anger against 
the representative symbols of abuse against public wealth. Voices at the time 
claimed: “what would we say about so many corrupt civil servants who had 
put the public services on sale awarding them to the best wager and trafficking 
with the national wealth?.”83 Such outrages transformed the government into 
an enemy of authentic political liberalism. For this reason, attacking it, 
involved doing justice. This would be precisely the centre of the manifestos 
opening the revolution: to the shout of down with the thieves, were added 
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those of Long live the Queen! Long live the Constitution! Long live Freedom! 
Long live Morality!84 
 
In Madrid, several eye-witness accounts coincide with the version 
signed by A son of the People. The author, probably a well-known 
progressive, unburdens the popular responsibility for the attacks produced. He 
started to remove all blame on the citizens regarding the attempt to create 
disorder. He assured that in the beginning, bandits and thieves were the ones 
who attacked the houses who always appear to steal in cities when revolutions 
broke out and the people joined them, always as an innocent and passive 
assistant, on realising that the enemies were the same:  
 
“in fact, they were attacks, but attacks in which the people took no part, but 
as a simple spectator, as a simple and well-meaning assistant of a certain 
class of people, who wanted there to be revolutions every day of the 
importance of that of July to [...] dedicate themselves to looting and 
disorder.”85 
 
Afterwards, he finished confirming the conscious will of the masses in 
the attack against Las Rejas Palace, recognising that only there the assault was 
deliberate. Then he granted a greater role to the dissatisfied people, saying 
that: 
 
“the people had asked and asked for the heads of Cristina, Sartorius 
and his spokesmen, the punishment of the Polish, but it had not 
thought about anything else: however, when it saw the furniture of its 
enemies burned, it joined the fires, but as an assistant.”86 
 
This was a quite confusing situation. Almost in every European 
revolution this image of the bandits, sometimes as true thieves, appear, 87 but 
in other cases the revolutionary groups –les classes dangereuses- are 
identified with those that the men in power want to prosecute.88 Actually, in 
the case we consider now, is very difficult to know who created those social 
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disturbances. But, in any case -and according to the official version- those 
thieves began the attacks that the people followed. The crowd created great 
disorders in the city, the military forces killed many people and afterwards 
they were not blamed for starting that situation. In my opinion they branded 
the initiators of the disturbances as outlaws for two reasons. First, to hide the 
political nature of the revolution that the government feared to the point of 
trying to suppress it with laws against banditry. It was precisely at that time 
that it issued laws to this effect;89 it was not by chance that it repressed the 
military upon glimpsing their sedition. The people were also strongly attacked 
as bandits and mercenaries.90 Secondly, the word bandit was used later on to 
differentiate the bad masses from the good masses, thanks to the intervention 
of whom this people’s revolution was won. After this happened, according to 
the contemporary socialist Fernando Garrido, “the throne was placed at the 
feet of the conquering people”, transforming the uprising of the military 
moderates into a democratic one.91 In my opinion, this role of the people in the 
victory generated versions such as those stated by “A Son of the People”, 
which would excuse their part in the riots. The description of the burnings that 
will be mentioned below falls along the same lines. 
 
A Justified Attack: The Expiatory Pyre. 
 
The Son of the people reported that the initial aim of popular violence 
was to capture the corrupt clique. Its members were very well known, the 
band represented by the Count of San Luis,92 as Marx said. Fearing the 
attacks, they fled. The Duke of Riansares himself, left several documents in 
different parts of his office in the Las Rejas Street, when suddenly he had to 
go due to the July revolution.93 When the multitude of men and women 
headed, shouting, “To the houses of the ministers!” as their cry went up, while 
they were singing the popular song of “Death to Cristina!” to the tune of “La 
donna è mobile”, although she had already escaped through a side door of her 
mansion towards the Palace.94 Then, the people found it necessary to modify 
their goals. A few individuals went to the Teatro del Príncipe, set a step-ladder 
to the façade “and armed with hammers and mattocks converted into a 
thousand pieces the inscription where the name of the Count of San Luis was 
written.”95 The unforeseen circumstances of the uprising unleashed their 
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passion. The attack by established power against a supposedly well placed 
individual –which gave a greater air of impartiality to the assailant plebiscite-
justified the reprisal of the ordinary people in their defence: 
 
“when the people searched for Sartorius in his home of Calle del Prado, the 
servile and loathsome zeal of one of the policemen who still guarded the 
house, caused by the shooting of a young person of good appearance and 
decently dressed. [.] This inflamed the fury of the masses [,] crushing the 
policemen [,] disarming them and entering thirsty for revenge. Not finding 
Sartorius, who was well hidden, they partially vented their fury on the former 
minister’s furniture.”96 
 
Then, the fires began. They were pure collective ways of symbolic 
expiation of revenge, by burning emblems or portraits of the people’s 
enemies.97 In the homes of Collantes and Salamanca, the furniture, the 
crockery, the trappings were thrown over the balconies to the street making a 
big bonfire with them and later on, a new “auto-da-fé” were made in 
Domenech’s home (the Minister of the Treasury).98 Pérez Galdós also 
gathered part of this fury unleashed against said objects, whose revenge, he 
satirised, was too benevolent: 
 
“the items of carpentry paid the bill, a too benign popular revenge… I 
thought that the destruction of luxury furniture is an act favourable to 
industrial progress and renovation of sumptuary styles [...]. The fire hardly 
harmed the Salamancas and Sartorius families and providentially benefited 
the manufacturers.”99 
 
The bonfire permitted social justice to be accomplished because it 
allowed the symbolic expiation of all the excesses. But the attack should be 
exclusively focussed on specific targets and only attack those to blame. A 
collaborator in the events reported this when he narrated what they threw 
away:  
 
“curtains, mirrors, beds, books, papers, jewels […] carriages, with which 
different bonfires were built in a row in front of each house. In that of the 
former minister of the Treasury, the fire spread to the building on igniting a 
blind of a room on the ground floor. However, the people themselves put it 
out immediately, assuring that no damage would occur in the other homes of 
the buildings, nor to their neighbours.”100 
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 “Burning the pieces of furniture of the Palaces of Sartorius and Collantes”. Lithography by J. 
J. Martínez, edited by Antonio Santa Coloma, in: Un hijo del Pueblo, Las jornadas de 
Julio…, 254.  
 
 
Also their servants were respected, although they served corrupt 
people. They were only interested in their belongings. In front of  Las Rejas 
Palace Palace, where María Cristina lived: 
 
“they had made a bonfire, in which men and women of a dishevelled 
appearance threw away what they had removed from the palace: furniture, 
pictures and curtains. I don’t know what would have happened to the Queen 
Mother if they had been able to pick her up like a sofa. I heard that the 
servants were respected; I also heard that they would smash into smithereens 
everything that was too heavy to take to the bonfire.”101 
 
Among the justification mechanisms of the assaults underlay the 
consideration that such acts were, in spite of being barbarous, just. They 
represented a lesson. The novelist Galdós noticed that Truly benign is the 
barbarism of a people who take their revenge on furniture, porcelain and inert 
objects.102 Kiernan stated that all this furniture suffered the sins of their 
owners.103 With the burning of Luis Sartorius’ home, the Son of the people 
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debated the moral category of such bonfires, which he considered indicative of 
a popular justice. He explained: 
 
“the people were not opposed to those bonfires and this is very natural; they 
should feel and felt great pleasure on seeing the apparatus of sumptuousness 
of those miserable people burn who had transformed the sweat of the poor 
and the tears of the underprivileged into pomp and luxury. The people 
surrounded those bonfires taking the furniture, the crockery, the paintings and 
throwing them into the flames.”104 
 
Benito Pérez Galdós also perceived this equanimity, as it was the only 
way the people had to impose a punishment against those breaches of all 
moral and Christian laws which –according to the author- are included in the 
normal government of societies. Then he explained that they had no other 
inspiration than their hate, a true reason of State for citizens that had never 
governed and then, with barbarous actions they governed in their own way, 
imposing something similar to justice, if not justice itself in all its 
splendour.105 Those flames could also be justified because there was a feeling 
that the common moral laws that united the people to their representatives, the 
social pact, in fact had been broken. In a speech of the provisional Barcelona 
government the need was mentioned for the breaking up of the despicable 
gang that had destroyed the holy book of fundamental law and that had tried to 
divorce the throne from the people, which had put an end to the freedom and 
the morality of the country.106 
 
The El Saladero prison was also stormed and its prisoners, with the 
progressive Rivero among their number, were freed. The Town Hall, where a 
group was going to constitute a government, was also taken.107 The huge 
building on the southwest side of the Puerta del Sol, which housed the 
Ministry of the Interior, was easily approached because the sentries did not 
fire; the rioters took it shortly after nine p.m.108  The crowd also epitomised 
the struggle for power in another purely symbolic and indulgent assault. 
Galdós left his testimony once again, describing that the masses managed to 
enter in the “Old Post Office”, headquarters of the Government, reaching the 
rooms of the Home Office, but respecting the objects of value. The goal was 
not to steal or destroy them but to illuminate the rooms of a building 
symbolising repression and darkness. Then, every time lights approached the 
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windows, the expectant crowd cheered. There was another very interesting 
manner of compensation: 
 
“this manner of popular revenge was childish. The pleasure given by sitting 
in the easy chair that had been used by San Luis, was not less innocent. The 
compatriots discussed by blows who had the honour to sit in it, a claim that 
for many seemed enough. What more could the people wish than convert the 
tyrant’s chair into a national piece of furniture for the use of all 
Spaniards?”109 
 
 
Robbery: Unjust. 
 
The burning and the popular uprising were considered to have been 
justified up to a point and even within an order. According to the British 
diplomats Otway and Hardman there were no serious excesses nor 
misconduct, outrage, or robbery. In their reports they emphasised the lack of 
looting and the principle of “the death penalty for the thief” with which the 
people were threatened.110 This implies that the attacks of the masses were 
considered to be legitimate insofar as they were fighting for what we can call a 
political objective, as their destruction only sought to punish the abuse of 
power and never to commit further outrages. The justice of protest included 
the condition of honest procedure. It was represented by the coherent attitude 
of the citizens, righteous but not thieves: 
 
“in these fires, the most precious objects were thrown into the flames without 
any distinction and wherever the slightest intention of robbery was observed, 
the people themselves repressed them in a terrible way. The people carried 
the firewood on their shoulders with great rejoicing and cheering liberty.”111 
 
A scene from the fire in Jose Salamanca’s palace clarifies this sense of 
social honesty. It proved that the target was to teach the corrupt band a lesson: 
purge the enemy of freedom in the bonfire, but never rob him, which was 
impartially punished by the crowd itself: 
 
“to show an example that the people’s goal on taking part in those fires was 
to partially punish their belongings [,] since they could not punish those 
perverting the course of justice themselves, and not the desire of benefiting 
from that wealth, it is sufficient to refer to a single fact. A black individual 
wearing a kind of woollen overcoat was moving away and as one of the many 
armed patriots saw that he carried something beneath his overcoat, he stopped 
him [,] searching him and finding a silver washbasin: the justice of the people 
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immediately fell over the thief caning him to death and the washbasin melted 
in the bonfire.”112 
 
This last sentence explains very well the concept of the social justice 
of the protest: the people considered it impartial to destroy the valuables of a 
palace but never to remove them. Destroying them, was equivalent to 
attacking its owner and his sumptuousness, originated by an unjust excess of 
power. Robbing implied being an enemy of liberalism and robbing was what 
the ministers had done. Part of the symbolic meaning of that popular 
revolution was underlying here, since the slogans reflected in the engravings 
of long live liberty or long live to the sovereign people were joined by that of 
death penalty to the thieves.113 For this reason, a proof of the people’s honesty 
was they had legitimated killing someone for stealing a valuable object for his 
personal benefit, no matter if he were rich or poor. The ultimate sense of the 
process was to make it disappear in a purifying pyre. In the Europe of the time 
such acts, far from deserving reprisals, were morally justified and were carried 
out as a kind of solemn public duty.114 
 
In my view it is relevant that the example of a person put to death by 
the mob was a black-coloured person. Black people were few in number in the 
Spain of the time; sometimes they were slaves or servants of the wealthy and 
racist conceptions generally prevailed to their detriment. Their case probably 
served to define the good man from the bad man by exclusion, to separate the 
community from the intruder who did not share its ideals. The thief, here 
distinguished by the colour of his skin, was very different from the community 
that was fighting for interests that were considered to be legitimate, as a result 
of which there was precisely a belief in the right to punish him without being 
reprimanded. On killing him the justice of their uprising was allegedly more 
evident as it arose for legal and moral reasons. In the last analysis, this 
example of the Black put to death, like the bandits that began the burnings, 
serves to exonerate the people and justify their vandalism. 
 
Compensation: The Attack of two Moderate Institutions.  
 
The assault of those places may only be understood as the popular 
protest against individuals whose power is archetypically manifested in the 
material form of a building.115 A similar goal was pursued when they attacked 
the headquarters of the Casino or El Heraldo. Both of them were mutually 
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related and with the government itself, as well as others whose palaces they 
attacked, since Sartorius, Collantes and Salamanca were members of that club. 
El Heraldo was the organ disseminating monarchic “moderantismo” for 
years.116 It was interpreted as a ministerial newspaper, a faithful interpreter of 
Sartorius’ cabinet, the only newspaper not suffering censorship in 1854 
because it clearly flattered its measures.117 Not only was it directed and written 
by many members of the club but it was its non-official organ of expression, 
since from there, the internal activities of the circle were conveyed. 
 
For this reason, it suffered the same luck as the palaces. As the people 
approached cheering liberty with firewood to ignite –a participant reported-, 
the press of El Heraldo was also invaded and they burnt all its contents.118 The 
attacks against it represented another way of harassing these actors of corrupt 
power in the name of freedom. The action was also represented in the last 
institution concerning us, the Casino. Some of those involved, Gándara and 
Salamanca, could be found in its rooms, discussing the rhythm of the events, 
when a waiter entered informing them that Sartorius’ house had started to 
burn.119 
 
In fact, the Casino del Principe was attacked on the 18th July. The 
rebels on the streets transformed this representative place of moderate social 
and political power into the target of their anger.120 The member Prudencio 
Rovira reported in a tendentious manner:  
“the Casino, which according to the progressive masses of the lowest social 
level was a reactionary centre, was about to suffer attacks from the mobs and 
had the same luck as the looted and fired houses of the Count of San Luis and 
Jose Salamanca.”121 
 
It happened the same day as the murder of Francisco Chico, a secret 
police inspector of reactionary ideology who was very unpopular among the 
top brass of the poor neighbourhoods.122 The mass formed a macabre parade: 
As reflected in the engravings of the period, they carried his body laying in a 
bed, supported over a ladder, whilst his face was spread with the chocolate he 
had been eating for breakfast when they had surprised him.  He was 
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surrounded by an entourage of ten thousand citizens who were hurling filth, 
stones, and insults at him. They battered him before shooting him in La Plaza 
de la Cebada.123 It would not be unreasonable to think that in the fires 
mentioned before, they had intended to spread this same justice to Sartorius 
and other ministers whose heads they had requested. If they had done so, they 
would possibly have dragged them through the city like Inspector Rico, since 
by venting their anger on the offender, exhibiting him in a walk, was a typical 
way of popular collective revenge.124 This was summarised by one of the most 
efficient means of spreading oral culture, the popular song sheet: with the lad 
executed, the people are avenged.125 However, that savage act was later 
repudiated by the liberal authorities, as San Miguel condemned it in a speech 
that brought tears to the eyes of several of his listeners.126 
 
 
 
 “Chico is carried to La Cebada Square”. Engraving by Rico in: Ribot y Fonserré, La 
revolución de Julio en Madrid…, p. 120. 
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They intended doing something similar in the Casino with another 
enemy of the people, the Count of Cuba. He chaired the club, where his shady 
dealing colleagues were and where he had sponsored other friends.127 A 
witness of the time criticised both him and all of them to justify this attack 
saying that: 
 
“they belonged to the school and gang of Cordoba, Gándara, Salamanca, 
Sartorius, etc., etc.., that is, he was a reckless spendthrift, a luxury lover, 
greedy for wealth to satisfy his need to fritter it away, a vane rake, an enemy 
of liberty due to his aristocratic airs, only wishing to give himself relevance 
and make a lot of noise.128 
 
After the revenge upon Chico’s body, they headed for the centre of 
symbolic power, since as a trophy of victory they, the tumult, went towards 
the centre of Madrid. That crowd was looking for the members of the club, 
and:  
 
“arrived at the Casino of Madrid to capture its President, the Count of Cuba, 
whose death was demanded by many voices. It was possible to know the plan 
of the rebels with sufficient time to create a small barricade in front of the 
Casino, defending it from any audacious attack. […] Behind that defence, 
several members resisted the attack of the mob.”129 
 
The government forces themselves went to defend them. A column 
captained by Gandara headed towards the rebels: 
 
“along the Carrera de San Jerónimo, where a company of civilians barricaded 
in the Casino, it replied to the attacks of the popular combatants. The Count 
of Cuba was to be found in the Casino, occupied in loading the soldier’s rifles 
to prevent them from bothering to load them.”130 
 
Again, similar mechanisms of social justice appear in this attack, when 
they helped the person attacked, allowing the possibility of him being saved: 
thanks to one of these traits of generosity and honesty, the rebels alongside 
other butchers made those days memorable, agreeing the transfer of the Count 
to hospital to be cured, hence finishing hostilities.131 Similar actions could be 
found in other European revolts, as a conciliation strategy.132 
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“The defenders of the barricades”. Notice that is written in the flags: “Long life to 
Liberty” “Long life to the Constitution” “Long life to Espartero” “Long life to 
O´Donnell” “Long life to the sovereign people”. Engraving by Rico, in: Ribot y 
Fonserré, La revolución de Julio en Madrid…, 152. 
 
 
Thanks to all those mechanisms of imposing justice, justification for 
the attacks and the resources of collective honesty, the people remained 
immune and at no time were they reproached for the attacks. The Revolution 
Hymn itself –with which this essay was started– showed how all these popular 
actions have only served to fight for liberty and the fatherland, and release 
itself from the slavery that oppressed the masses. In its words, the terms of 
decency, virtue, consciousness or generous, related to the people, were 
opposed by those of vile, cowardly, betrayal or weak and poor-spirited linked 
to the miscreant tycoons. The proclamations that extolled their victory 
acclaimed the “heroic”, “victorious”, and “sovereign people,” 133 at the feet of 
whom the throne had been placed. They were attributed the triumph of having 
converted a moderate military uprising into a democratic one. Because of this 
they had the legitimate right to be part of the entourage to receive the honours. 
As the song sheets said: the people, full of glory/ relish their victory; The 
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people who have fought/ form a proud parade.134 Such a decisive intervention 
in the change of government exonerated them from any blame for the 
disturbances. 
 
Undoubtedly, this exoneration could be due to the resulting victory of 
the progressive governors that had been exalted, like Evaristo San Miguel, 
Leopoldo O’Donnell or Baldomero Espartero, whose portraits had been 
carried as revolutionary banners. Espartero was considered a hero of the 
masses, also called Son of the people.135 Acclaimed at the time as the “man of 
the people” for his allegedly humble origins, he threw in his lot with the 
masses who now gave him power. Espartero himself repeated the slogan: “Let 
the national will be done.”136 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have studied a revolution generated by the discontent of the people 
regarding political leaders who had forgotten, amidst widespread corruption, 
how to govern them. We have seen the attacks against very precise targets 
which for the people had become symbols of moderate power: tycoon’s 
palaces where sumptuous objects were burned, the meeting place for moderate 
politicians or property of the press giving them a voice, all of them becoming 
expiatory centres for collective revenge. The latter was ruled by a popular 
moral attitude that identified the imposition of justice with the destruction of 
said symbols and even with the murder of someone to blame. However, at the 
same time, it was understood that this justice should be complete and could 
legitimise extinguishing the fire so as not to harm innocents, kill whoever tried 
to steal an object which should be burnt in the expiatory pyre, fight each other 
to sit in the chair of an ex-leader of the government or allow the President of 
the Casino himself who they had tried to kill, to be taken to hospital. On the 
other hand, these ways of fighting served to define the good community that 
died for and killed for principles that were considered just and moral so that 
the people might rule. Their banners were freedom, the Constitution, the 
monarchy and the leaders they considered honest. The people rose up against 
the rulers that transgressed these principles. At the outset the military returned 
the attacks with violence, accusing the people of being bandits and 
mercenaries. Later on a differentiation between the bandits and the people 
allowed for the former to be transformed into the enemy and accused of 
carrying out the initial attacks. 
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Later sources discharged the people from all blame, justifying the 
moral goal of their attacks. The manifestos, the skits, the engravings, the hymn 
and the remaining literary or historic sources tended to excuse such collective 
attacks. Military personnel who repressed them with the governmental forces 
had to justify themselves for their violent attitude. They even tried to 
assimilate the people’s ideals and proclamations after the event. All the latter 
was due to the victory of the progressive group the people had exalted. 
Obviously, this victory had to exalt the role of the people, exonerating them 
from any blame, whose triumph would lead to the period called “Liberal 
Biennium” (1854-1856), initially of a popular and progressive character. This 
dénouement was essential in order to establish in retrospect that it protected 
the people and completely justified the moral vengeance of the masses. 
 
 
